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IN THE SUPRE}!E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
CECIL EARL BROOKS and Case No. 16639 
JAMES CHARLES EDWARD GOOD, 
Defendant-Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from convictions of Aggravated Assault 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In a jury trial conducted before the Honorable Peter 
·Leary of the Third Judicial District Court, appellants were 
ound guilty of two counts of Aggravated Assault, a Third 
egree _Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102, 103 
nd §76-2-202 (1953 as amended), and sentenced to an indeterminate 
erm of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the conviction and judgments 
~endered below and a remand of the case to the Third Judicial 
~istrict for a new trial. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The alleged crime in the instant case took place in 
the "hobo jungle". The participants, four transient hobo-types, 
were camped at Roper Yards on the property of Denver and Rio 
Grande Railroad (T. 4) . The fourt had recently joined to ride the 
rails together, and were enroute to Grand Junction, Colorado. 
(PH 17, 18) From there, Donald Storie and Richard Vinson, 
(referred to as "Rico" in the record) were headed to Wyoming 
and eventually to Montana to work on a ranch. (PH 7, 17, 66, 90, rn 
Cecil Brooks and Jim Good were traveling east and would probably 
wind up in Michigan. (T.334) 
On April 23, 1979, Vinson, Brooks, and Good left the 
camp at an early hour to go downtown and give plasma for money. 
(PH 19, 89) Storie remained in camp alone until late afternoon 
when the three returned with food, wine, and tobacco. (PH 19,22) 
Storie cooked up a meal over a fire and the group passed around 
the jugs of wine. (PH 21,33,58) Later on, an argument develope1 
concerning money, and the four decided to split up. (PH 22 ,25) 
At preliminary hearing Donald Storie testified that 
while the four were traveling together they had agreed to pool 
their money. (PH 9) But a dispute developed over $14.00 which 
Storie said he saw Good stick down his boot. (PH 24) Good said 
that he lost the money, and Storie didn't believe him. (PH 24) 
As a result of the disagreement, the men decided to split up. 
Brooks and Good left the campsite, but returned later in the 
evening while Storie was making coffee and Vinson was asleep· (! 
-2-
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Storie testified that Brooks came at him with a knife, said 
"I didn't steal the $14.00", and then stabbed him in the chest. 
(PH 10) Storie claimed that as he struggled with Brooks, Jim 
!!Good hit him with an ax handle. 
and fell down in a swampy area. 
(PH 11) He was knocked unconscious 
(PH 12) When he came to, he 
observed Brooks and Good standing over Vinson, who was lying on 
the ground. Good said, "that son-of-a-bitch down there [referring 
l) to Storie] is dead. . . if you' re going to kill him, hurry up and 
kill him." Brooks responded, "well, I don't want to kill him, 
I just want to make him remember." (PH 12) Storie blacked out 
again, and when he came to, he crawled up to Vins6n ands aw that 
he was "bleeding real bad." (PH 13) He then made his way to 
the trainmaster's shack to get help. (PH 13) 
Richard Vinson also testified at preliminary hearing, 
although his memory of the events was somewhat foggy. He testified 
10 that after the four ate dinner and drank wine, he fell asleep. 
He didn't recall any dispute over $14.00 (PH 98) nor did he know 
of Good putting money down his boot. (PH 105, 118) Moreover, 
he was unaware that the other men had decided to "split". (PH 100) 
Be remembered waking up when it was dark and seeing a man standing 
i over him. (PH 99, 106). He said he was hit suddenly before he 
[
ould rise up, and then he was unconscious. (PH 108) 
Both men were medically treated for the injuries they 
Ustained. (T. 20203, 214) Storie had a stab wound in his left 
p~reast, lacerations on both thumbs, a fractured left thumb, two 
~acerations on his scalp, and bruises on his left wrist and 
I -3-
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forearm. (T. 2-215) Rico suffered two blunt lacerations on his 
forehead, one black eye, a laceration on his left arm, and a 
laceration of the neck. (T.203-204) 
At trial the preliminary hearing transcript (the testimony 
of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson) formed the basis of the 
State's case. The balance consisted of the testimony of several 
police officers, the custodians of the court recordings, and employe~ 
of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad. Both Cecil Brooks 
and James Good took the stand in their defense. (T.2-297,338) 
Brooks' testimony regarding the day's events was for the 
most part the same as Storie's. However, he mentioned that Good 
didn't eat any dinner, because he and Storie "had had words about 
the food". (T. 307) He remembered Storie and Good arguing about 
the $14.00 (T.309), and heard Vinson tell Good to get out of camp. 
Brooks retorted; "If Jim goes I'm going with him." (T.309) 
When Good attempted to take the tobacco, Storie told him "he wasn't 
taking a damn thing." (T.309) Storie then came at Brooks with 
a knife, and turned toward Good. (T.310) Meanwhile, Vinson, 
who was several feet from Brooks, came down a small slope toward 
him. Brooks testified that since Vinson had told him that he'd 
done fifteen years for killing someone with a knife he (Brooks) 
was "scared like hell." (T.311) He added that he had no reason 
to doubt Vinson because he had scars all over him from knife fights. 
Brooks and Vinson scuffled until Good pulled Vinson off and said 
"let's get out of here." The two walked down by the railroad 
tracks and encountered Scott Broussard, an investigator for the raiJrr 
-4- i ,.. 
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They asked him when the next train was leaving, and 
he told them to get out of the railroad yards. (T.2-53) 
The two men then walked north toward the viaduct, and later 
turned to walk back toward the "flashing lights". They were 
arrested as they were walking black toward camp. (T.320) 
Brooks sustained a cut in the palm of the left hand. 
(T. 314) 
Good's testimony revealed that on the way downtown 
Vinson ran into a man whom he had previously fought with. The 
man had a scar on his face where Vinson claimed to have hit 
him with a hammer. (T.342) Back in camp and drunk (T.351), 
Good argued with Storie about peeling potatoes too thick and 
wasting food. (T.348) Storie responded with "If you would 
take the $14.00 out of yr.our boot, we would have more food." 
Vinson then told Good he could "get the hell out of camp", 
and Good responded, "Sui ts me". (T. 350) When Good attempted 
to take the tobacco, Storie objected and came up with a knife. 
Good grabbed an ax handle and took two swings at Storie. 
(T.354) When Storie staggered back and fell in the swamp, 
Good turned and hit Vinson with the club to get him off of Brooks. 
(T.355) Brooks and Good walked up the path toward the railroad 
yards, and were later arrested as they headed back toward 
the flashing lights near camp. (T.357) 
-5-
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED DEFENDANTS THEIR 
-RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY ALLOWING THE 
STATE TO INTRODUCE THE eRUCIAL PART OF 
THEIR CASE-IN-CHIEF VIA A PRELIMINARY 
HEARING TAPE . 
At trial, and over appellant's strenuous objection, 
the State was allowed to introduce the taped preliminary 
hearing testimony of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson. 
The State was therefore able to introduce, not only the 
major part, but the critical part, of their substantive 
evidence through a tape recording machine. Appellants 
contend that the introduction of this evidence denied them 
their constitutional right to confront their accusers in 
open trial, as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 12. That section provides: 
[I]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause 
of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him. 
The United States Constitution provides the same 
protection within the contours of the Sixth Amendment. In 
illuminating the scope of that protection, the United States 
Supreme Court, while paying homage to the long valued right 
of confrontation, has recognized that it may be dispensed 
with under some circumstances. One of these circumstances 
concerns the use of preliminary hearing testimony at a 
criminal trial. 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Most recently in the case of Ohio v. Roberts, U.S. 
(40 CCH S.Ct. B3665, June 25, 1980), the Supreme Court expanded 
the State's freedom to introduce preliminary hearing testimony 
at trial where the witness is unavailable. There the defendant 
was charged with forgery and possession of stolen credit 
cards in the name of Bernard Isaacs. The Isaacs' daughter, 
Anita, was questioned by defense counsel at preliminary 
hearing concerning her interaction with the defendant. She 
testified that she had permitted him to use her apartment 
for several days while she was away, but denied giving him 
use of checks and credit cards belonging to her parents. 
Counsel did not ask the court to declare Anita a hostile 
witness, nor did the prosecutor question her. At trial, 
newly appointed defense counsel objected to the use of the 
preliminary hearing transcript on the basis that it violated 
the defendant's right to confrontation. The Court held that 
there was no constitutional violation where Anita was unavailable 
to testify at trial, and the preliminary hearing transcript bore 
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to afford the "trier of 
fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of [the] 
prior statement," citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 
(1970). Thus, because the prior statement was made under oath, 
and defense counsel was not nsignificantly limited in any way 
in the scope or nature of his cross-examination," 399 U.S. at 
166, the transcript was admissible at the subsequent trial. 
Notwithstanding the disposition of the issue in the 
context of federal constitutional law, appellants submit that 
- 7-
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this court can and must afford them greater protection than 
the Roberts decision. It is well recognized that a state is 
free to construe its own constitution more narrowly than 
the federal constitution, even though the provisions involved 
are similar. See, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). 
The right to confront one's accusers in open trial is a 
cherished and vital right. It envisions 
A personal examination and cross-examination of 
the witness in which the accused has an 
opporttmity, not only of testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience of 
the witness, but of compelling him to stand 
face to face with the jury in order that they 
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor 
upon the stand and the manner in which he 
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of 
belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 
237, 242-3 (1895). 
Utah has recognized, since the early case of State v. Mannion, 
57 P.2d 542 (1899), that these rights are essential to a fair 
trial. This Court must therefore take notice of the manner 
in which these rights have been sacrificed in the instant 
case, and re-examine the policy and spirit behind Utah's 
confrontation clause. 
Other states have recently tackled the issue, and 
have resolved the dileI!IIlla in favor of the defendant. 
In People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (1979), the Supreme Court 
of Colorado considered the question of whether a transcript 
of preliminary hearing testimony should be admissible at a 
subsequent trial. The defendant in Smith was initially 
the subject of a civil suit brought by Carmack Motors to 
recover possession of a tractor. Smith and John Burnite 
-8-
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testified at trial that they were together at Carmack Motors 
on a certain date, and Smith made a cash payment for the tractor. 
The controversy was resolved against Smith and he was subsequently 
charged with perjury, conspiracy to commit perjury, and tampering 
with a witness. Burnite testified at Smith's preliminary 
hearing; only this time he recanted his earlier testimony. 
Under oath, he admitted that he had agreed to go along with Smith's 
story because of Smith's poor luck, inability to make a living, 
and concern that a prior felony conviction might undermine 
his credibility. Burnite died prior to trial, and a transcript 
of his testimony was admitted into evidence at Smith's trial, 
over the latter's objection. On appeal, the State Supreme 
Court held that in view of the limited scope of a 
preliminary hearing, the State Constitution precluded the 
admission of a preliminary hearing transcript at a subsequent 
trial, even though the witness was clearly unavailable. 
The Colorado court acknowledged the general admissibility 
of recorded testimony taken at a prior judicial proceeding 
where the witness has become unavailable and the right of 
cross-examination has been exercised. The court observed 
that "transcripts from a previous trial provide no basis for 
objection since the defendant presumably has received the full 
panoply of procedural and substantive protections." Id. at 207. 
But where the prior judicial proceeding is a preliminary 
hearing, the court was convinced that critical differences 
come into play. A preliminary hearing, the court noted, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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is limited to a determination of probable cause and in effect 
functions as a screening device. Furthermore, evidentiary 
and procedural rules are relaxed, and the credibility of 
witnesses is generally not explored (cf Utah Code Ann. §77-15-19 
(1953 as amended)). As a result counsel does not have the 
same motive to cross-examine at preliminary hearing as he 
does at trial. To illustrate, the court pointed to the 
transcript; counsel did not cross-examine regarding the 
prejudicial statement that Smith was afraid a prior felony 
conviction would undermine his credibility, and counsel did 
not explore Burnite' s· credibility even though the issue 
was ripe since he was recanting previous testimony. 
The above considerations, then, led the Colorado 
Court to conclude that a preliminary hearing is too limited 
in scope to allow testimony recorded at it to be introduced 
at a subsequent trial, regardless of the availability of the 
witness. New Jersey has also modified its rule to reflect an 
appreciation for the differences between evidence given at a 
preliminary hearing and evidence given at a trial. In 
State v. Moody, 404 A.2d 370 (1978), the court construed its 
rule of evidence providing for the admission of testimony 
given at a prior hearing where the witness is unavailable to 
include only testimony given at a prior trial. The court noted 
that the legislature intended to exclude testimony given at a 
preliminary hearing for the reason that cross-examination 
in such proceedings is either nonexistent or inadequate. 
I 
-10- ~ 
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Other courts, while not as a matter of law excluding 
preliminary hearing testimony, recognize the importance of 
exercising caution in admitting such evidence. In Poe v. 
Turner, 353 F. Supp. 672 (1972), the court held that an unavailable 
witness' recorded testimony from a prior trial was 
admissible in the defendant's second trial. The court 
observed that the defendant was unable to point to any 
deficiencies in the confrontation or cross-examination of the 
witnesses at the first trial. The court went on, however, to 
distinguish the nature of cross-examination in the context 
of a preliminary hearing: 
Nor can oetitioner point to any reasons 
counsel might have had on that occasion for 
exercising restraint in the conduct of the 
cross-examination, as petitioner perhaps 
could do had the testimony in question been 
offered at a preliminary hearing. At a 
preliminary hearing, where the standard to 
be met by the prosecution is probable 
cause, rather than guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a vigorous defense is less important 
and might serve only to harden and preserve 
the prosecution's case. Id at 677. 
Similar considerations were discussed in People v. Gibbs, 
63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1967). There the court held that an informer's 
transcribed testimony taken at preliminary hearing was 
inadmissible at defendant's trial due to inadequate cross-
examination. The court suggested that several qualitative factors 
play a role in determining whether cross-examination at a 
prior proceeding has been adequate. Those factors are the 
nature of the proceeding, the character of the witness 
and his connection with the events, the extent and subject 
-11-
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of his direct testimony, and the time and preparatory 
opportunities available to the accused and his attorney. 
The court elaborated on the significance of the nature of 
the proceeding : 
[T]he preliminary examination is conducted 
as a rather perfunctory uncontested proceeding 
with only one likely denouement - an order 
holding. the defendant for trial. Only television 
lawyers customarily demolish the prosecution 
in the magistrate's court. The prosecution 
need show only "probable cause," a burden 
vastly lighter than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Cormnitting magistrates usually accept the 
prosecution evidence at face value, leaving credibility judgments for the trial of guilt. The tactical 
influences pervading the process tend to induce 
shallow cross-examination. Limited cross-examination 
at the preliminary hearing is a frequent tactic 
of adept and skilled defense lawyers. Cross-
examination may lack width and depth, not because 
counsel lacks opportunity, but because he chooses 
to defer his real effort until the trial itself. 
The choice creates no defense disadvantage if 
the prosecution witness testifies at the trial. 
He is then available for painstaking and incisive 
cross-examination. If the witness disappears 
and his transcribed testimony is read to the jury, the opportunity for cross-examination 
disappears with him. [T]hat situation exposes 
the defense to grave tactical damage. 
[Citations and footnotes omitted] Id. at 475 
.In the instant case, appellants asserted a number 
of arguments in support of their motion to exclude the 
preliminary hearing tapes. Consistent with discussion in the 
above - cited cases, defense counsel argued that a 
preliminary hearing in Utah is ordinarily a much less searching 
exploration into the merits of the case than a trial because 
the burden of proof is probable cause as opposed to reasonable 
doubt. (T.M. 57-58) Counsel contended that trial tactics 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are different at a preliminary hearing, and so may change the 
nature of the questions asked and the witnesses called. 
Moreover, at the time of preliminary hearing defense 
counsel was ignorant of several statements made to police 
officers since that information was unavailable under Utah's 
discovery rules. (T.M. 70) Counsel argued that the lack 
of this sort of information severely curtailed their ability 
to impeach the witnesses by confronting them with their prior 
statements. Support for the exclusion of the tapes on this 
basis alone is found in the case law. In People v. Garcia, 
382 N.E. 2d 316,(1978) the court admitted a witness' preliminary 
hearing testimony at trial. Defendant contended that this 
was a denial of his right to confrontation since the preliminary 
hearing occurred before he was permitted discovery. On appeal, 
the court held the evidence admissible and observed that a 
defendant is not denied adequate cross-examination if further 
cross-examination would be of no benefit to him. Since 
the defendant was unable to show that cross-examination of 
the witness at the preliminary hearing would have been enhanced 
by material made available through discovery, he was denied 
relief on appeal. 
Appellants contend that in the present case availability 
of prior inconsistent statements made by Vinson and Storie 
would have enabled them to impeach their credibility and substantially 
weaken the State's case. 
Additionally, where witnesses are unavailable to testify 
at trial, the trier of fact is deprived of any opportunity to observe 
............__ -1~-
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demeanor and evaluate credibility. An absent witness can't 
be confronted with prior inconsistent statements made at the 
preliminary hearing, nor can his "sweating brow" or "twitching 
cheek" be observed. (T .M. 70). If a defendant's right 
to confrontation is to have any substance, it must be 
accompanied by a convergent right to impeach the confronted 
witness. Prior recorded testimony should be excluded where 
that right has not been fully exercised. In People v. Reed, 
414 N.Y. S. 2d 89 (1979), the court did exclude a preliminary 
hearing transcript where defense counsel was unaware of the 
chronic alcoholism of the witness at the time of preliminary 
hearing, and hence, did not go into the credibility of the 
witness or his accuracy of recollection. 
Similarly, in the instant case, counsel did not explore 
the victims' history of alcohol abuse or propensity for 
violent behavior. Defense counsel was unable to use such 
information to either buttress the defendants' claim of 
self-defense or impair the credibility of the victims' 
recollection of the alleged crime. Appellants submit that 
in this case credibility of the State's witnesses was 
critical to a conviction. The victims and defendants had 
traveled together for several weeks and were ostensibly 
"friends". A disagreement and split occurred, and two versions 
of the evening's events emerged. The State's failure to 
provide any observable witnesses to present the victims' 
version precluded the jury from pursuing its task with any 
effica,cy. A judgment of credibility cannot adequately be 
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made when only half the "picture" is viewed. It was essential 
that the jury physically observe the stature and demeanor of 
all four participants, hear all possible defenses, and weigh 
the evidence accordingly. For the State's failure to provide 
the jury with this opportunity, appellants submit that they 
were denied not only their constitutional right to confrontation, 
but their right to a fair trial. 
Appellants are aware that this court has allowed prior 
testimony to be introduced at a subsequent trial under some 
circumstances. (See State v. Oniskor, 410 P.2d 929 (1973)); 
at trial State may introduce testimony given by witnesses at 
preliminary hearing if good faith effort to secure attendance 
of witnesses is shown; Gallegos v. Turner, 526 P.2d 1128 
(1974); on petition for habeas corpus testimony of rape victim 
at first hearing was admissible at second hearing where witness 
was shown to be unavailable.) However, it is interesting to 
note that the statutory authority which may have in part 
formed the basis for the admissibility of such testimony has 
been repealed under the new Code of Criminal Procedure, effective 
July 1, 1980. (See provisions of old code; Utah Code Ann. 
§77-44-3, and §77-1-8(4), 1953 as amended) Only one remaining 
provision arguably authorizes the introduction of testimony 
recorded at a preliminary hearing, and that is Rule 63(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. However, appellants submit that 
admission of the prior testimony in the instant case does not 
comport with the guidelines set forth in subsection (3) of 
Rule 63. Specifically, "on the former occasion" appellants 
-15-
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did not have "an interest and motive similar" to that which 
they had at trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently discussed the defendant's 
right to certain procedural safeguards in the context of a 
preliminary hearing in State v. Brackenbury, No. 16372 
(~.ay 29, 1980). The court described the fundamental purpose 
of the preliminary hearing as the "ferreting out of groundless 
and improvident prosecutions," Id. at 7, and went on to state: 
Several ancillary purposes supplement 
the primary purpose of the hearing. 
The examination provides a means of 
effectively advising the defendant of 
the nature of the accusations against him. 
The hearing also provides a discovery device 
in which the defendant is not only informed 
of nature of the State's case against him, 
but is provided a means by which he can discover 
and preserve favorable evidence. 
The discovery available at the preliminary 
hearing represents an important step in the 
preparation of the defendant's defense for the 
subsequent trial. [footnotes omitted] 
Id. at 8. 
Thus, the·preliminary hearing is a~· albeit an important 
one, towards a trial which will afford the defendant the full 
panoply of procedural and substantive safeguards. A defendant's 
interest and motive at preliminary hearing is primarily 
informational and assists in the preparation of an effective 
defense. 
At trial, the defendant's interest and motive is 
presenting an effective defense, which necessarily includes the 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opportunity to impeach the credibility of the evidence against 
him. Confrontation of a witness enables him to demonstrate 
to the jury the witness' demeanor. This display in the 
courtroom should not be underestimated. As the Supreme Court 
of Oregon, in State v. Smyth, 593 P.2d 1166 (1979), recently said: 
In our system a defendant is not tried on a 
dossier compiled in prior hearings, no matter 
how fairly and judiciously conducted. His 
guilt must be established at the trial by 
evidence that convinces a fact finder beyond 
a reasonable doubt. But the earlier opportunity 
to question the witness will often avail little 
when the jury at the trial sees neither the 
witness nor the effect of the cross-examination 
recorded in a cold transcript. As the United 
States Supreme Court stated-in Barber, 
'[t]he right to confrontation is basically a 
trial right. It includes both the opportunity 
to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury 
to weigh the demeanor of the witness.' 390 
U.S. at 725, Id. at 82. 
Appellants submit that the denial of this crucial 
trial right has prevented them from obtaining a fair trial, 
and urge this court to revitalize the spirit behind Utah's 
constitutional right to confrontation by ruling that the 
preliminary hearing tapes should have been excluded. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING TAPES IN VIEW OF THE STATE'S FAILURE TO 
SATISFY THE TWO REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE. 
Most recently in Ohio v. Poberts, __ U.S. __ , (40 
CCH S.Ct. B 3665, June 25, 1980), the United States Supreme 
Court reiterated two crucial requirements which must be 
satisfied before a court may admit the preliminary hearing 
testimony of an absent witness at a subsequent trial. The 
party offering the testimony must first demonstrate that a good 
faith effort has been made to procure the attendance of the 
witness at trial. Secondly, the hearsay is admissible only 
if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability so as to assure 
its trustworthiness. Neither requirement has been satisfied 
in the instant case, and admission of the preliminary hearing 
tapes was therefore error. 
THE STATE FAILED TO MAKE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO 
OBTAIN THE WITNESSES AT TRIAL. 
In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court declared that "[a] witness is not 
'unavailable' for purposes of [an] exception to the confrontatior 
requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made 
a good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." Utah 
has recognized the constitutional standard set out in Barber 
and has held that the State's failure to exercise due diligence 
in securing the attendance of witnesses at trial does indeed 
operate as a denial of the defendant's rights. See 
State v. Oniskor, 410 P.2d 929 (1973). Whether the state has 
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exercised reasonable diligence must be determined from the 
facts and circumstances of each particular case. 
The facts of the instant case militate against a finding 
that the State exercised due diligence in procuring the attendance 
of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson at trial. James Foster, 
a detective for the Salt Lake Police Department, testified 
that, following the preliminary hearing on May 16th, he returned 
Vinson and Storie to Saint Mary's Home (an alcoholic rehabilitation 
center). Six days later, on May 22nd, he received a phone 
call from Vinson informing him that Storie had left town on 
May 18. (T.H.M. 8) Foster notified the prosecutor of this 
development on May 25, and she directed that they "wait and 
see" if Storie returned. (T.H.M. 9) Subsequently, on 
June 19th, Foster was contacted by Jessie Barker (victim 
witness~department.-r-County Attorney's Office) who indicated that 
had left an address of next of kin in Bakersfield with his 
physician, Dr. Berman. (T.H.M. 9) Through contacting the 
Bakersfield Police Department, Foster was able to locate a 
phone number for Everett Tracy, Storie's half-brother. When 
contacted, Tracy said he hadn't seen his "brother", but told 
Foster that Storie had visited a brother-in-law in Fresno 
during the latter part of May. (T.H.M. 12) Foster also checked 
with the Greyline and Trail ways Bus Co. and welfare assistance 
on June 19th, but was unable to uncover any leads. (T.H.M. 11, 
17) No -further effort was made until July 6, just 3 days 
before the date set for trial. At that time Foster contacted 
-19-
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Joe Cavenetti, Storie's brother-in-law in Fresno, Cavenetti 
had not seen Storie but suggested that Foster call Storie's 
twin brother in Phoenix. (T .H.M. 14) A check with the brother, 
and also with the Rescue ~.issions in Fresno and Sacramento, 
revealed no information as to Storie's whereabouts. Foster 
and Sgt. Fontaine also checked the post office, Saint Mary's 
Home, the Salt Lake Rescue Mission, and Pioneer Park, to no 
avail. (T.H.M. 13, 17, 18) It is undisputed that Detective 
Foster never received a subpoena for Donald Storie. (T.H.M. 
17) 
During this period of time Foster had contact with 
Richard Vinson on two occasions. Vinson, as indicated above, 
called Foster on May 22nd to inform him of Storie' s disappearance 
In addition Vinson contacted Foster on May 25th to tell him 
that he had moved to the Tower Hotel, a halfway house. When 
Foster received a subpoena for Vinson, a call to the manager 
of the hotel revealed that Vinson had moved out approximately 
a week and one-half earlier. (T. H .M. 17) On June 18th special 
agent Scott Broussard informed Foster that he had seen Vinson 
down at the railroad yards, but merely advised him to get off 
railroad proper"ty. (T.H.M. 16) Neither Vinson nor Storie 
was ever located by Detective Foster. Subsequent to the day 
set for trial, on July lOtl( the subpoena ordered Vinson to appear 
on the 9th) Detective Foster finally contacted the Cross Ranch 
in Montana, but to no avail. (T.290) 
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When viewed in light of relevant case law, these facts 
plainly do not rise to the level of due diligence required of 
the State. In Fresneda v. State 483 P.2d 1011 (Alas. 1971), 
on facts markedly similar to those in the present case, the 
court found the State's efforts to be lacking in due diligence. 
There the District Attorney's secretary made a few limited 
efforts to locate the missing witness earlier in the month 
before the trial, but no systematic search.was begun before 
December 22, with trial scheduled for December 29. At that 
time police records were checked, and several hours of telephone 
conversations revealed a strong possibility that the witness 
had joined the army. At trial the witness' enlistment 
was verified, but his actual location was never determined. 
Significantly, no subpoena for the witness was ever issued. 
The court found the efforts to locate and return the witness 
did not rise to a level of due diligence, and therefore 
the prior testimony of the witness was inadmissible. 
A factor noted by the court in Fresneda, and identified 
by another court as an "important element to be weighed", is 
the lapse of time between the State's awareness of the necessity 
of procuring a missing witness for trial and the start of the 
search to locate him. People v. Horn, 36 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1964) 
In the instant case, the State was notified that Storie had 
disappeared on May 22nd, yet no e;ffort • .,as made to locate him 
until a month later, and then only in response to a lead 
~ffered by a third party. Moreover, another one-half month 
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passed before the State attempted to follow up on the 
information disclosed by Tracy on June 19th. Cavenetti 
was not contacted until July 6th, nor were other·>possible 
leads pursued until that date. Since the trial date was known 
on May 25th, it is obvious that the inquiries made on July 
6th were little more than last-ditch efforts to find witnesses 
for a trial fast approaching. 
While appellants don't begrudge the prosecutor and 
detective their rights to a summer vacation, they do question 
the limited vitality with which the State pursued its 
obligation to afford them fundamental protections, (See 
T.H.M. 29, 51) Serious efforts to locate the witnesses 
collDilenced only after the prosecutor returned from her vacation. 
Investigation was further thwarted by the fact that Detective 
Foster had been on vacation for a week and in Denver for a 
week. (T.H.M. 28) He also admitted that due to a heavy 
case load and his assignment to more important cases, 
appellants' case had been relegated to a lower priority. 
(T.H.M. 29) While independently these collateral concerns 
may be understandable, and even excusable, their cummulative 
effect in the instant case was to preclude a systematic and 
thorough effort to locate the missing witnesses. 
It is also essential that a prosecutor pursue all 
specific leads, as well as other reasonable alternatives, in hi5 
search for a witness. In People v. Starr, 280 N.W. 2d 519 (19n1 
three attempts to serve a missing witness with a subpoena were 
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unsuccessful. During the last attempt, on Jtme 29th, 
officers learned that the witness was out-of-state on vacation 
and his whereabouts was tmknown. On July 5, the day 
before trial, the prosecutor contacted the witness' mother and 
was told that she didn't know when he was coming back. The 
preliminary hearing testimony of the witness was admitted 
at trial over appellant's objection. 
On appeal, the court held that the State failed to 
make a diligent effort to find the witness. The court noted 
that other steps were feasible and should have been tmdertaken. 
The State could have· contacted five individuals who were present 
on the night of the incident, including the witness' girlfriend, 
or checked out a rtnnor concerning the witness' whereabouts, 
or talked to officers where defendant was incarcerated who 
were well-acquainted with the movement of people in the area 
in which the principals lived. The fact that the inquiries 
may not have been fruitful was immaterial to the court. The 
prosecutor still had a duty to pursue not only specific 
leads, but also those endeavors reasonably likely to produce 
them.: 
Where there are no leads as to a witness' whereabouts, 
the prosecutor should inquire of known persons who 
might reasonably be expected to have information that 
would help locate the witness. Where there are 
specific leads as to a witness' location, the 
prosecutoriii'USt check them out. Id. at 521. 
(Emphasis added) 
(See also People v. Mcintosh, 204 N.W. 2d 135, (Mich 1973); no 
due diligence where "most specific lead was not checked out 
at all by prosecutor.") 
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In addition, the prosecutor has a duty to supervise 
and coordinate the effort to locate the missing witness. 
In State v. Greer, 552 P.2d 1212 (1976), an investigator was 
requested to locate a witness for trial on January 20th. 
When the defendant failed to appear for trial a bench warrant 
was issued, and trial was reset for July 1. On June 23, 
the investigator received another request to locate the 
witness. He checked the Motor Vehicle Department, Driver's 
License Bureau, talked to the witness' sister-in-law who 
referred him to the witness' mother who was unaware of his 
whereabouts, and atten:pted to serve a subpoena on 
the witness at an address obtained through the Motor Vehicle 
Department. 
The court held that the trial court erred in its finding 
that the State made sufficient effort to place the witness 
under subpoena. Where the investigator failed to check the 
witness' previous place of employment, or to question the 
witness' mother or sister-in-law in sufficient depth or 
to check an address listed in the police report, such failure was 
fatal to the State's claim of "due diligence". The court 
emphasized the responsibility of the prosecutor to supervise 
and coordinate the investigation. Since the prosecutor neither 
instructed the investigator to make further efforts nor 
suggested additional leads, he was unable to show that due 
diligence had been exercised. 
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The investigation engaged in by the State must 
consist of something other than the mere dialing of telephone 
numbers. In People v. Rogers, 398 N.E. 2d 1058 (1979) the court 
held that effort consisting of eight to ten telephone calls 
to contact the witness did not amount to a good faith 
effort by the state, The court observed that 
[T)he mere failure to successfully contact a 
missing witness by telaphone falls far short of 
a demonstration of due diligence in attempting 
to locate the witness. Clearly, some effort 
other than telephone communication should 
have been employed to secure [the witness'] 
presence. Id. at 1060. 
In the present casP., efforts to locate Storie and 
Vinson consisted primarily of telephone calls made on 
June 19th and July 6th. Other reasonable efforts could have and 
should have been employed to locate the witnesses. For 
instance, at no time did Detective Foster visit Roper 
Yards in order to obtain leads on the hobos' whereabouts. 
It is likely that he could have seen them in the "jungle" 
or at least conversed with other hobos who might have been 
able to aid in the search. Indeed, Agent Broussard did see 
Vinson at the yards on the 18th. Nor did Detective Foster 
attempt to contact the "Cross Ranch" in Montana prior to 
trial or the authorities. in Oroville. Both Storie and Vinson 
mentioned going to the Cross .Ranch numerous times at the 
preliminary hearing. (PH 7, 17, 66, 72, 90, 115) The hobos 
also talked about going up to a ranch in Montana to work when 
they made their statement to Foster. (T.H.M. 38) But 
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despite these specific references to their intended destination 
no attempt whatsoever was made by the State to follow up on 
the lead. 
The prosecutor failed to supervise and coordinate the 
effort to locate the witnesses. She was aware of the 
numerous references to the "Cross Ranch" and yet failed to 
instruct Detective Foster to pursue the lead. She also failed 
to inform Foster of the trial date which was known to her on 
the 25th of May, so that Foster could have relayed the information 
to Vinson when he called from the Tower Motel. Moreover, 
Foster never received a subpoena from the prosecutor for Donald 
Storie. Clearly, the State was remiss in its duty to adequately 
supervise and coordinate the search for Storie and Vinson. 
Due diligence also requires that the State take steps 
to insure the appearance of a witness when there is reason 
to know that he might not appear for trial. In Flores v. 
People, 593 P.2d 316 (1978), the preliminary hearing 
testimony of a priest was admitted at trial, where on the 
trial date the priest was in the hospital in critical condition 
as a result of complications due to leukemia. On appeal, 
defendant argued that the testimony was inadmissible because 
the State failed to exercise due diligence in procuring 
Father Dudley's presence at trial. The Colorado Supreme Court 
agreed and found that the State's efforts fell below the 
standard required. The court observed that the district 
attorney not only knew of the priest's potentially terminal 
illness four months before trial, but also knew of his whereabouti 
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The court felt that in light of those facts, the State had 
an obligation to preserve Father Dudley's testimony by 
way of deposition. In conclusion, the court stressed that 
Where a party seeking to introduce testimony 
from prior judicial proceedings has notice of 
facts which probably would render a witness 
unavailable on the day of trial, that party has 
a duty to pursue means of preserving the 
witness' testimony. Id at 319. 
In the instant case, no effort was made to either 
preserve the testimony of the witnesses or assure their attendance 
at trial. Both the prosecutor and Detective Foster were 
aware of the transient habits of hobos riding the rails. 
They had reason to know that Vinson and Storie had no 
intention of remaining in Salt Lake for any extended time, 
especially since neither had sought employment. Yet, it 
would have been possible to take any of several steps 
to insure their presence at trial. As the court suggested 
in Flores their testimony could have been preserved via a 
deposition. Or a subpoena could have been issued at the 
preliminary hearing to advise of an approximate trial.date, 
pending verification. Additionally, no attempt was made to 
utilize the provisions in Utah Code Ann. §77-15-25 and 
§77-15-26 (1953 as amended). Those sectiops provide that a 
witness may be required to post a bond or surety if the 
magistrate is satisfied that there is reason to believe that 
the witness will not appear at trial. 
The mere fact that these witnesses were transients 
doesn't absolve the State of its responsibility to produce them 
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at trial. While transients naturally are more difficult to 
locate, the standard of due diligence is not modified accordingly, 
The State's burden nevertheless remains high. In People v. 
Enriguez, 561 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1977), a transient's preliminary 
hearing testimony which was critical to the prosecution's 
case was admitted at trial. The California Supreme Court 
found this to be error and listed the steps the people could 
have taken to locate Prieto, the transient 17 year old. The 
State could have checked the high school Prieto testified 
that he expected to attend. Prieto had also indicated that 
he might be picking fruit "up north"i yet the prosecution 
failed to try and reach him through employer organizations, 
farm labor unions, or other employee organizations. In 
addition the court observed that no effort was made to ascertain 
the names of Prieto' s friends or acquaintances who might have been 
able to provide information. The court rejected the argument 
that such efforts would be unsuccessful and disapproved 
of the prosecutor's remark that " [t]trying to serve 
a warrant on an itinerant fruit picker is like looking for 
a needle in a haystack." Id. at 271. [cf State v. Anderson, 
599 P.2d 1225 (Or. App. 1979), where the court found that 
due diligence had been exercised in locating a transient 
"hippie-type" individual; subpoena taken to last known address 
on two occasions, local post office contacted and other 
addresses checked, sheriff's deputies spoke with other persons 
living in the cabin and surrounding areas, follow-up contacts 
with people in the area and calls to District Attorney in 
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California. The search began in early May, 1978, as soon 
as a trial date was set for August 29, 1978, and continued 
to the day of trial.] 
A comparison of the State's efforts in the instant 
case to those employed in the above-cited cases compels the 
conclusion that these witn~sses were not "unavailable" for 
purposes of admitting their prior testimony. It is obvious 
that something less than a "good faith" effort was 
utilized to track them down. Substantial, positive leads 
were ignored. The brunt of the investigation was postponed 
until the last minute, and even then it consisted of little 
more than a half-hearted, perfunctory attempt. This court 
should not allow the prosecution to so casually dispense 
with appellants' vital constitutional rights. 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TAPE DID NOT BEAR 
SUFFICIENT !Nb!c!A OF RELWIL!TY TO PERMIT 
ITS ADMISSION AT TRIAL. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Ohio v, Roberts, 
su:ii:-a observed that there are sufficient "guarantees of trust-
worthiness in the accoutrements of the preliminary hearing 
itself. . " so as to permit the admission of an unavailable 
witness' preliminary hearing testimony at trial, 
citing Galifornia v. Green 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Appellants 
submit that a blanket application of this principle to the 
facts of.the instant case would be manifestly unfair. Rather, 
a more cautious evaluation of the reliability of Storie and 
Vinson's preliminary hearing testimony should be undertaken. 
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While a closer scrutiny is not constitutionally mandated, this 
court can nonetheless afford appellants greater protection of 
important constitutional guarantees. 
Counsel for appellants requested the trial court to 
grant them a hearing on the reliability of the tapes prior to 
their admission at trial. (T.H.M. 83) As support for the 
court's ability to grant them such a hearing they cited the 
case of California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, at 186 n. 20, wherein 
Justice Harlan, concurring, stated: 
It will, of course, be the unusual situation where 
the prosecution's entire case is built upon 
hearsay testimony of an unavailable witness. In 
such circumstances the defendant would be entitled 
to a hearin on the reliabilit of the testimon 
citations Ollll.tte 
The Circuit Court in United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170 
(D.C. Cir. 1969), also approved such a procedure. There the 
trial court held a hearing out of the jury's presence 
to determine whether certain hearsay testimony was reliable 
enough to be admitted. 
Appellants submit that a hearing in the instant case 
would have demonstrated the patent unreliability of the 
preliminary hearing testimony of both Donald Storie and 
Richard Vinson. Of noteworthy significance is the fact that 
the hearsay testimony of these two hobos, who were 
ostensibly friends of the two defendants, formed the crux 
of the prosecution's case. Their testimony, therefore, must 
be scrutinized closely. Storie and Vinson had every reason 
to lie at preliminary hearing. They knew they would not appear 
at trial, and so the threat of a perjury prosecution was 
-30-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nonexistent. Moreover, it was advantageous for both men 
to testify for the State at preliminary hearing since the 
State picked up the medical bills and made every effort to 
keep its prosecution witnesses comfortable. (T.H.M. 71) 
The testimony itself is replete with internal 
inconsistencies and incredible statements. Storie testified 
that Good put the $14.00 down his boot, and they later argued 
about Good losing it. (PH 24) Yet Storie goes on to testify 
that Brooks came at him with a knife, saying "I didn't steal 
the $14. 00" .(PH 10) There was testimony by Storie that 
the ax handle which was used to hit Good was taken from a box 
car. (PH 11) Yet the firewood the hobos were burning was 
comprised solely of ax handles, (PH 33) Storie testified that 
after the "fracas" Vinson was laying motionless on his front 
(face down), and Vinson testified that he was laying on his 
back. (PH 41, 108) Vinson also testified that, despite his 
inability to recall the events of the scuffle, he was certain 
that it occurred around 8:00 p.m. since he could tell time by 
the stars. (PH 113) These examples of some of the statements 
made by the two hobos illustrate the unreliability of the 
testimony that, in and of itself, convicted the appellants. 
Perhaps the jury would have been more sensitive to the 
incredibility of the testimony had they seen the seedy characters 
who offered it. In any event, where the hobos were missing 
at trial, and the evidence was critical to the State's case, 
it was inctllllbant on the court to conduct a hearing on the 
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admissibility of such unreliable testimony. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE APPELLANTS ' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO. 23 
Defense counsel excepted to the refusal of the trial 
court to give Instruction No. 23 (T.2-388), which stated 
that: 
The absence of a testifying witness who could 
provide the jury with material evidence is one 
factor you may consider when weighing their 
credibility. The jury should view with caution 
such testimony if you find that the witness 
could have made themselves available for 
trial. 
You should always bear in mind that the law 
never imposes on a defendant in a criminal case 
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or 
producing any evidence. 
Comi.sel maintained that the jury was entitled to a cautionary 
instruction on the use of extensive hearsay evidence at trial. 
As support for the contention, counsel referred the court to 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 (1970), note 20, 
Justice Harlan, concurring, which said that: 
Due process also requires that the defense be 
given ample opportunity to alert the jury to 
the pitfalls of accepting hearsay at face 
value, and the defendant would, of course, 
u on re uest be entitled to cautiona 
instructions. c . § • , Manua on ury 
Instructions, 33 FRD 501 (missing witnesses). 
(Emphasis added) 
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Appellants submit that such an instruction is not 
only appropriate, but necessary, under the unique circumstances 
of this case. The prosecution's case was built principally on 
hearsay, and the jury Wis in a poor position to appreciate the 
implications of that fact. They were likely to accept the 
hearsay at face value, and disregard inconsistencies in testimony 
that would otherwise impeach a witness on the stand before 
them. Moreover, their judgment was hampered by being 
deprived of additional material evidence (for instance, evidence 
relating to appellants' claims of self-defense) because the 
witnesses chose to absent themselves from the process of the 
Court. 
The effect of all of this in the courtroom is obvious. 
The jury observes two motley-looking characters sitting at 
defense tabile, and ultimately views their somewhat "seedy" 
demeanor on the witness stand. Meanwhile, via tape recordings, 
they only hear innocent cries of the alleged victims. Were 
the victims available to testify, their "seedy demeanor" would 
match that of the defendants, and the jury would be forced to 
fully evaluate the credibility of ali four. The decision would 
become more difficult; Internal inconsistencies in testimony 
would assume greater relevancy as they bore on the witnesses' 
credibility. And appel:hant:Js' claims.,of 'Self-defense 'would· be 
scrutinized in thee context of the 'ltot:Jal picture". Thus, 'When 
both- the loss of critical demeanor evidence and the unearthing 
of additional material evidence hampers an effective defense, 
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at the very least the defendant is entitled to an instruction 
cautioning the jury in their evaluation of the hearsay. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 'FHE VERDICT 
Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient 
as a matter of law to support the verdicts in Count I, 
Aggravated Assault upon Richard Donald Vinson, and Count II, 
Aggravated Assault upon Donald L. Storie. 
The standard in Utah for review of the sufficiency 
of the evidence for a confiction is that "it must appear that 
upon so viewing the evidence reasonable minds must necessarily 
entertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant conmitted 
crime." State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977). An 
application of this standard to the facts of the instant case 
mandates a reversal of the convictions on both counts. 
The testimony of Donald Storie and Richard Vinson was 
replete with internal inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Richard Vinson specifically remembered that James Good hit him 
on the right temple with a stick or pick handle, and yet had 
been "sleeping" innnediately before the blow was struck. 
Curiously, Storie provoked the argument regarding the lost 
money in Good's boot, yet lacked any knowledge whatsoever of 
how the men's possessions were split up. The witnesses 
testified inconsistently as to who was drunk, and to what 
extent. Other examples of the unreliability of the 
testimony appear under Point II. In short, the testimony of 
these two unavailable witnesses was unbelieveable. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 




However, it is equally arguable that the.testimony 
of Brooks and Good was lacking in credibility as well. Thus, 
the jury was left with a choice between two far-fetched accounts 
of an evening's events. They could believe that Brooks and Good 
defended themselves when Storie and Vinson attempted to kick 
them out of camp and keep the tobacco, or they could accept 
Storie's and Vinson's version that Brooks and Good later 
returned to the campsite to assault them. 
Where either story is plausible, a verdict of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt is impossible. In all probability 
this was simply an altercation between four hobos who ganged 
up on each other and argued over the dividing of possessions. 
Reasonable minds could not therefore believe Brooks and Good 
were guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State has failed to sustain its burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt. A finding of guilt on these facts amounts 
to nothing more than a conviction on the basis of probable cause. 
Considerations of due process prevent convictions based on 
insufficient proof and an unreliable evidentiary basis. Appellants 
are therefore entitled a reversal of the verdicts rendered against 
them. 
Respectfully submitted this /~f/day of September, 
1980. 
On behlilf of defendant-appellant CECIL EARL BROOKS, 
I can see no other issues 
in this brief. 
On behalf of defendant-appellant JAMES CHARLES EDWARD GOOD, 
I can see no other issues that should be raised that are not 
included in this brief. 
Appellant Gooa I 
I, 
I 
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